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1. Background of Research 
 
The years before the financial crisis of 2007-2008 can be seen as the 
golden age of monetary policy. Monetary policy in the developed world 
was conducted by independent central banks operating on solid 
theoretical fundamentals and a mature institutional system, pursuing clear 
objectives and using well-developed toolset. Their results in maintaining 
price stability and smoothing business cycles confirmed the adequacy of 
monetary policy thinking. Most economists agreed that monetary policy 
could serve long-term growth and social welfare by maintaining price 
stability, defined as a positive but close to zero inflation rate. Central 
banks achieved this goal by using indirect instruments, i.e. interest rate 
policy. As a result of their success and the consensus on the role of 
monetary policy, the leading central banks achieved outstanding 
credibility. However, the challenges of the crisis has forced academic 
researchers, central bankers and policymakers to rethink the earlier 
comfortable consensus. 
In addition to the debate on instruments and objectives, strong 
expectations have arisen requiring central banks to contribute and to 
provide solutions through their monetary policy and instruments, to 
addressing the real economic problems caused by the crisis. The debates 
have arisen along the following issues: 
 Whether and to what extent are central banks responsible for the 
crisis? 
 Is it possible or necessary to change central banks’ objectives? 
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 How should financial stability be implemented through monetary 
policy? 
 What kind of instruments can central banks use to address the 
effects of the crisis, and what outcome and risks are expected from 
their application? 
These issues deeply undermine previous theoretical consensus and 
practice and influence the future of monetary policy. The choice of the 
topic of the research is the result of this rare situation where a sudden 
change in a mature area has occurred and the topic has thus come into the 
focus of both academia and the central banks. Moreover, this was not only 
about a particular aspect of monetary policy, but about issues affecting it 
as a whole and in a substantive way. That is why the research has not 
been confined to a narrow segment, instead it deals comprehensively with 
the changes in monetary policy objectives and instruments after the crisis, 
and with the debates and experiences about those, in order to draw 
conclusions on the future of monetary policy. 
Thematically, the dissertation deals with three main issues. Firstly, the 
possibility of revising monetary policy objectives is discussed. Prior to the 
crisis, the renewal of the neoclassical synthesis, and inflation targeting 
from its emergence to the 2000s, received the attention of academia and 
of central banks. By the pre-crisis years, a consensus emerged regarding 
monetary policy objectives, while inflation targeting was a successful and 
widely-used regime in the advanced world. However, in the years 
following the crisis, debates have arisen about the objectives and the 
adequacy of inflation targeting has been questioned.  The impact of the 
crisis on the real economy was so strong that it called into question even 
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the results achieved earlier. Central banks thus have to face social and 
political expectations that require them to take effective action to 
economic recovery and support the government’s economic policy. This 
does not mean that the principle of central bank independence in 
monetary policy should be given up or questioned, however, this cannot 
be an argument either for refusing a debate on a possible change of 
monetary policy objectives. 
The dissertation addresses financial stability issues in relation to monetary 
policy objectives. Due to what is happened, it is a widely accepted view 
that financial stability must be treated as a priority.  After the crisis, the 
renewed micro-prudential supervision continues to play a leading role in 
securing financial stability, but the need to set up a macroprudential 
protective framework, that is aimed at addressing the stability of the 
financial system as a whole, has also arisen. The question is, in which 
form this should be achieved: integrated in, or separately from, monetary 
decision-making. The institutional reform that has been completed and the 
emerging new practice have resulted in separate management of the two 
objectives, where the price stability objective is the mandate of monetary 
policy while financial stability is that of macroprudential policy. 
However, it cannot be affirmed that this division is a final consensus and 
that this is the future way to achieve the two goals at the same time. 
The other main direction of the dissertation is to comprehensively analyze 
how monetary policy instruments have changed after the crisis. As a 
result of the crisis, the framework for the monetary toolset was altered 
and expanded significantly. The outbreak of the crisis challenged the 
„lender of last resort” role of central banks, while its macroeconomic 
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consequences threatened the central banks’ main objectives. At the same 
time, once the zero lower bound was reached, monetary policy lost its 
traditional room for maneuver. Thus, in recent years, central banks used a 
number of non-conventional instruments, namely: quantitative easing, 
forward-looking guidance, credit easing and negative interest rates. The 
examination of their effectiveness and risks is the focus of academic and 
central bank research. Non-conventional instruments changed the 
monetary policy framework for the long term and influenced its possible 
path in the future. 
The third part of the dissertation is an analysis of the policy of the 
European Central Bank (ECB) following the crisis. The ECB's extended 
asset purchase program, with the simultaneous use of additional monetary 
policy measures, started several years later and under circumstances 
different from those of similar programs of other leading central banks 
after the financial crisis. In addition to the causes and consequences of the 
delay, the heterogeneity of the euro area also makes this issue interesting. 
After the crisis, euro area divergence was not only a unique challenge for 
the common European monetary policy, but also provided additional 
experience of using non-conventional instruments. 
 
. 
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2. Objectives 
 
The dissertation set aims for all the three areas mentioned previously: i) 
the objectives of monetary policy, ii) the use of non-conventional 
instruments, and iii) the ECB practice after the crisis: 
1. It addresses to the question whether revising monetary policy 
objectives is really necessary as a consequence of the crisis. Based on the 
proposals that have emerged, it discusses why there has been no 
substantial change in the previous consensus on the objectives, what are 
the still open issues and whether any change is likely in this area. 
The severity of the crisis, the magnitude of central bank and government 
interventions, and the resulting impact on the real economy, the depletion 
of conventional monetary policy instruments were the reasons why the 
previous consensus on monetary policy objectives had to be revised. The 
first element of this debate was how to reduce the likelihood of recurrence 
of the liquidity trap and of hitting the zero lower bound. Next a revision 
of objectives was suggested in order to ensure that monetary policy 
remains an effective economic policy tool even in the case of a liquidity 
trap. Initial criticisms that inflation targeting was a flawed monetary 
practice ceased relatively quickly. The focus was on the numerical change 
of the inflation target or on setting up alternative objectives. 
Although no change has been either in the objectives or in the inflation 
target number, the case cannot yet be finally closed. That is why it is 
worth analysing the proposals and the debate around them. 
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2. It examines the real possibility of integrating the financial stability 
objective into monetary decision-making. Based on the analysis of 
arguments and criticisms of the new practice applied following the crisis, 
it draws attention to its shortcomings. 
There was, already previously, a debate on how monetary policy should 
react to asset price bubbles and financial cycle developments. One option 
would be to directly integrate the stability objective into central bank 
decision-making. This is the so-called "Leaning against the wind" policy. 
The central bank, when taking into account the financial cycles in 
monetary policy decisions, typically intervenes in the opposite direction 
to the movement of the markets when this is justified by the stability 
objective. Although there was no complete consensus on it, pre-crisis 
practice preferred the so-called "clean up" or "mop up" strategy which 
handles market disturbance arising from a bursting bubble that hampering 
monetary objectives and / or the proper functioning of the transmission 
mechanism. In doing so, the central bank provided the liquidity expansion 
necessary for market clean-up. 
However, the 2007-2008 financial crisis has drawn attention to the risks 
and costs of this strategy. After the crisis, financial stability was clearly 
given a priority in financial reforms, re-launching the debate. In addition, 
the mainstream view newly formed on the relationship between monetary 
policy and financial stability needs to be analyzed in order to see its 
adequacy and its shortcomings. 
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3. It collects and categorizes the non-conventional instruments used by 
central banks and suggests its comprehensive definition. 
Even before the financial crisis, there was some literature on the search 
for possible room for maneuver and for instruments of monetary policy at 
the zero lower bound. Thus, central banks were not completely 
unprepared in the sense that there was a theoretical basis for the 
applicable instruments and their supposed working mechanism, even 
though there was insufficient experience in using those measures. 
Actually, the instruments themselves were not unknown in the potential 
central bank toolset either. The way central banks thought about them, the 
reasons for their use, and the way they were used reflected differences in 
practice. Also, in some cases, the boundary separating them from 
conventional instruments is narrow. That is why the categorization of 
these instruments is recommended. 
4. It analyzes the pros and cons of the use of non-conventional 
instruments applied, and offers an opinion on their expected use during 
and after the normalization. 
In recent years, the greatest attention to the use of non-conventional 
instruments was given. The focus was primarily on their effectiveness in 
the way they work theoretically and in empirical evidence. There are 
many criticisms of their side effects and risks, too. These instruments 
became dominant in recent years in the toolset of leading central banks, 
and in addition, they modified central banks’ balance sheets for a long 
time. Therefore, returning to conventional instruments will be neither a 
simple nor a short process. Thus, on the one hand, it is worth to weigh up 
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and to evaluate criticisms of non-conventional instruments, and, on the 
other hand, it is important to find an answer to the question of what kind 
of lasting impact of the non-conventional instruments make on the future 
operation of the central banks. 
5. The dissertation explores the challenges the ECB faced during and 
after the crisis and the causes and the consequences of delays of the 
European quantitative easing. It analyzes and evaluates the ECB's 
program in light of the expected impact, the experience, and the special 
aspects of the euro area, and expresses an opinion on the criticisms on it. 
The ECB's response to the crisis has been different that of other leading 
central banks, right from the beginning. The differences between member 
states in their economic and financial sectors have led to divergence and 
fragmentation of the financial intermediation system. Consequently, the 
ECB faced serious problems other than those encountered by the other 
central banks. The heterogeneity and divergence within the euro area had 
an impact on the effect of the non-conventional instruments used, on their 
effectiveness and ultimately on the success and risks of the ECB's 
program. The quantitative easing of the ECB started with a significant 
delay compared to the other leading central banks, with again, several 
consequences. The examination of these consequences as well as the 
criticisms against the ECB add value to the evaluation of non-
conventional instruments too. 
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3. Materials and methods of the research 
 
The research relies basically on information from three areas. The basis 
for examining central bank objectives and tools is an extensive review of 
the literature. This includes papers on the pre-crisis consensus, primarily 
from the academia, and central banks. The challenges monetary policy 
confronted following the crisis, the renewal of monetary policy, the 
examination and the criticism of the central banks’ measures were 
undoubtedly accompanied by a high attention of the profession. Literature 
was widely consulted: research by international institutions, central 
banks, and conference papers, in order to provide a full picture of the 
most important directions of research in recent years and professional 
opinions. Conceptual and empirical studies were both available in 
significant numbers. The latter mainly examined the effectiveness of non-
conventional instruments and the measures connected to financial 
stability. The research relies on a number of essays summarizing a large 
numbers of empirical studies. In the case of criticisms of the use of non-
conventional instruments and of monetary policy practice, central bank 
opinion is also analyzed. 
The review and analysis of the measures implemented by the leading 
central banks (ECB, the Federal Reserve, the Bank of Japan and the Bank 
of England) from 2007 to date is the second pillar of the discussion and 
the analysis of non-conventional instruments and ECB practice. These 
were typically programs covering a series of time-formed, successive 
packages of measures that are commonly designed by different names by 
the profession or the media (such as QE1, QE2, and QE3 in the US). The 
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relevant central bank materials (announcements, protocols, press 
conference materials, technical and content manuals, data on their use, 
etc.) available on the central banks' websites were collected and processed 
in the course of the research. 
The dissertation collects and processes monetary, market and economic 
data in a wide range, giving the third base of the analysis. The data 
published by the central banks, including the ECB, is the core of these. 
Several series of data are presented in the dissertation for the purpose of 
international comparison, for which the official data of countries or region 
had to be collected from not only central banks but also other national 
institutions (eg, statistical office, treasury, etc.). In addition, data provided 
by supranational organizations and data suppliers (eg, IMF, OECD, 
Eurostat) have been used. Some European datasets are available as a 
result of innovation or initiative originating outside the formal reporting 
institutions, typically by academia, and which was partly disclosed later 
by the ECB due to their importance. The data processed in the dissertation 
were occasionally based on such unique data services, but it should be 
noted that these data are also based on reliable euro area data services in 
the Member States. Market information, was of course, collected 
occasionally from data published by a market actor or alliance or by a 
market data provider institute. In connection with the objectives of the 
dissertation, analyzes of time series, graphical presentation and 
international comparison are carried out. 
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4. Conclusions and suggestions 
 
The challenges facing monetary policy during and after the financial crisis 
in 2007-2008 brought radical changes to central bank practice. 
Overcoming the crisis and the bail-out of the financial intermediary 
system needed the „lender of last resort „role of central banks and even 
the intervention of governments to an extent that had not been anticipated 
before. After the crisis, a major economic downturn occurred, the output 
was permanently lagging behind potential, deflation threatened, and the 
achievement of the objectives of monetary policy was compromised. 
As a result, radical changes occurred in thinking about financial stability 
and institutional system. A debate arose also about the changing of central 
bank objectives, but it has not led to either in the reformulation of the 
objectives or in the numerical change of the inflation target. The reasons 
were the strength of the previous consensus and the disagreement of 
academia about the new proposals. Thus, central bankers were not open to 
make changes in these. However, they were far less opposed to changes 
in the instruments. Following the crisis, each of the leading central banks 
introduced an arsenal of non-conventional instruments, although the 
theoretical background of the use of these instruments was rather vague, 
and practical experience was only marginally available. The assessment 
of these instruments is not unambiguous in the light of events. Although, 
due to the results, the advocates of using non-conventional instruments 
are in majority, criticisms are also numerous and not unfounded, because 
of the risks and negative side effects of the measures. 
 
14 
 
Based on the results of the areas examined, the following conclusions can 
be drawn and the following suggestions can be made: 
1. No significant change can be expected in the central banks’ monetary 
policy objectives, and the case for flexible inflation targeting has been 
even strengthened. An increase in target rate of inflation is unlikely, but it 
is advisable to continue the discussion about the optimum target rate and 
pursue further research. 
From a theoretical approach, history-dependent strategies emerged as 
alternatives to inflation targeting because they provide the central bank 
with a more flexible framework to conduct a more effective and sustained 
monetary policy at the zero lower bound. This could help also short-term 
macro stability. In an inflation targeting regime, expectations about a 
central bank's credible strategy are difficult to shape in the direction, that 
the extremely loose monetary policy persists for a long-term, without 
creating doubts around anti-inflationary commitment. The main 
uncertainty about history-dependent strategies is whether central banks 
using them would be able to anchor inflation expectations as successfully 
as they did during the current regime. Furthermore, the flexible inflation 
targeting regime has two important roles in the zero interest period, 
reinforcing the arguments for its application. On the one hand, based on 
the operational logic of the regime and its impact on expectations, it is 
capable of acting effectively against the formation of a deflationary spiral. 
It does not tolerate deviations from the inflation target and helps in 
keeping expectations not to turn deflationary. On the other hand, inflation 
targeting, as a guarantee, also protects against the inflationary risks of 
non-conventional instruments, partly by anchoring expectations. To fine-
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tune the regime and to take greater account of growth risks, pursuing 
research can bring new results. 
While there seems to be a clear direction to keep the current regime, the 
opinions on the numerical inflation target are more divided. Raising the 
inflation target would have benefit, regarding in particular the avoidance 
of hitting the zero lower bound in the future. A higher target may assist in 
smoothing macro adjustments within the Eurozone, too. However, at a 
higher inflation target, it is uncertain whether inflation expectations could 
be kept anchored. Furthermore, it is not likely that different inflation 
target can be defined for each of the macro-regions, given international 
financial implications. Although the debate on this has not been closed 
definitively, even if the resistance of central bankers weakens over time, 
the practical significance of and the motivation for increasing the inflation 
target from its current 2 percent value, will be reduced. Thus, for the time 
being, it is likely that the current target remains unchanged. 
However, there is a number of reasons why it is worthwhile to keep open 
the issue of the inflation target value. The outcome of a debate on the 
causes and the persistence of a low-interest rate environment is important 
to determine the appropriate target value. If theories claiming that there is 
a sustained slowdown in growth and that cyclical factors have impact on 
potential growth, advance, then this will have an impact on the rules and 
strategy of monetary policy. This means that, in addition to the risk of 
inflation, the central bank must take into account the growth risks, in a 
different way and with greater weight than it did before. The estimates 
for the frequency and the macroeconomic costs of the occurrence of a 
zero lower bound are depend heavily on parameters (such as real interest 
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rates), the changes of which can be interpreted differently, in light of the 
debate mentioned above. All of these factors can reinforce the arguments 
that support an increase in the target rate of inflation. 
2. The direct integration of financial stability objectives into monetary 
policy decision-making is not expected.  However, the issue cannot be 
regarded as definitively closed, even in light of the recent institutional 
reform following the crisis. Based on experience, future research will 
have the task of exploring and understanding conflicts and cross-effects 
between the objectives of monetary and macroprudential policy. 
In light of the recent financial crisis, it is beyond doubt that financial 
stability objective should be given greater priority in the future than was 
the case before. At present, neither the theoretical background nor 
empirical experience provide sufficient evidence or reference for central 
banks to move substantially away from their previous monetary policy 
framework and adopt a „leaning against the wind” policy. In sum, the use 
of macroprudential instruments seems to be more promising and more 
acceptable by the central banks. In the end, the post-crisis reform did not 
cause a radical change to monetary policy, but the previous consensus 
was supplemented by placing the stability issues under a newly 
established macroprudential mandate besides microprudential 
supervision.  Of course, financial stability issues do not disappear from 
the tasks of central banks, their priority even increases. In several cases, 
macroprudential and microprudential supervision are placed within the 
organization of the central bank, but operate separately from monetary 
policy decision-making. However, the issue cannot be considered as 
definitively closed, despite the currently prevailing practice. 
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On the one hand, there are open questions the application of 
macroprudential policy as well. There is uncertainty in the selection of 
instruments and in the appropriate numerical calibration of 
macroprudential rules. Consequently, their efficiency can only be 
concluded from the experience gained during their use. On the other hand, 
bringing macroprudential and monetary policy in proper harmony is a 
future task. If both areas work well they reinforce each other. However, 
there is yet no practice and thus no experience whether and how they will 
endanger each other's performance if a conflict arises between the two 
separate mandates. This issue will emerge especially in the euro area 
where monetary policy is supranational, while the macroprudential 
mandate is largely within the competence of the member states. Monetary 
policy decision-making itself does not lack financial stability 
considerations. Such considerations must be taken into account not only 
when the central bank’s „lender of last resort” role is activated, but also in 
all cases where central bankers think that monetary policy objectives are 
threatened by stability problems. 
Future experience relating to this and the theoretical development of 
„leaning against the wind” can bring new results, too. Therefore, research 
should continue analysing the effectiveness of macroprudential 
instruments and their interactions with monetary policy. 
3. The use of non-conventional instruments during and after the financial 
crisis resulted in sustained changes in monetary policy practices that may 
remain after the period of normalization too. However, although the 
negative side effects of non-conventional instruments did not occur to 
such an extent so far that would call into question their use, those cannot 
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be ignored. Therefore, building on the ongoing experience, it is necessary 
to pursue research in this area. 
As a result of central banks' actions to overcome the financial crisis, the 
„lending of last resort” role was broadened, and to a wider range of 
financial intermediaries became eligible to use central bank funding 
instruments. The events highlighted the importance of longer-term central 
bank funding, resulting in the lengthening of central bank liquidity 
providing facilities. 
The implemented and the ongoing central bank quantitative easing 
programs also caused a lasting change in monetary policy. These 
programs resulted in changes in central bank balance sheets to such an 
extent, that they cannot be resized back soon. However, holding these 
assets in the central bank balance sheet for a prolonged period, does not 
rule out the effective application of the traditional interest rate tool. Thus, 
in normal times, conventional central bank instruments may be dominant. 
The lasting transformation of central bank balance sheet and the sustained 
low-interest rate environment together indicate that, if necessary, 
nonconventional measures can be used as tools of monetary easing in the 
future as well. An important factor behind this is that, according to 
experience, these instruments were effective and no serious damage was 
seen as a side effect of their use. 
However, the cost-benefit analysis of non-conventional measures needs to 
be pursued. Considering the diminishing positive effect of asset 
purchases, it cannot be affirmed with any certainty, that the expected 
returns from their use will exceed the costs of their side effects in the 
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future too. The market distortions they cause, the profitability pressures 
on the financial sector they generate, and their negative consequences that 
may occur in central bank profits in the future, may later pose real 
problems. 
Whether and how the transmission mechanism of interest rate policy 
changes, as a result of changes in the central bank toolset, needs to be 
addressed in the future too. The increase in the role of long-term liquidity 
providing facilities among central bank instruments and the lasting 
changes of central bank balance sheets have an impact on how traditional 
interest rate policy functions. Growing the quantity of the long-term 
central bank instruments, increases the importance of the interest rate on 
those, and lengthens the time period for which the central bank's interest 
rate is decisive. As the central bank balance sheet changes, the significant 
holdings of free reserves must be taken into account, putting the deposit 
side of the standing facility and interest on deposits into the main role. 
These, in turn, result in changes in the impact of traditional interest rate 
policy, and that furthermore, the can be influenced by the interaction 
between these two instruments. 
The assessment of forward guidance is much more clear. Forward 
guidance reinforced the effectiveness of asset purchase programs. The 
widened and more detailed communication of central banks contributed to 
preserve the credibility and generally bolstered the transparency of 
monetary policy. The success and increased transparency make it likely 
that forward guidance will persist in some form. This will also be needed 
if quantitative easing is continue to be a part of the applied toolset in the 
future. 
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4. Although the ECB launched its quantitative easing program with a 
delay compared to other leading central banks, so far it has been 
effective. Due to the delay, however, the non-conventional instruments 
had to be selected and calibrated so that they were sufficiently effective, 
which, in turn, increased the risks. The diminishing return of the program 
and the lasting fragmentation of the Eurozone financial markets draw 
attention to the limits of the possibilities of the ECB and of monetary 
policy in general, and to the particular importance of continuous analysis 
of side effects. 
There is a consensus that the ECB's quantitative easing program has 
substantially lowered interest rates, supported the improvement of the real 
economy and contributed to avert the danger of deflation. However, its 
effectiveness is decreasing, the risks are considerable and can 
significantly influence the ultimate success of and judgment on the 
program. 
In particular, the negative impact on the long-term profitability of the 
banking sector, the distortion of the government securities’markets and 
the factors that indicate the fragmentation of the Eurozone financial 
markets have to be highlighted. This latter points to the fact that monetary 
policy is not appropriate to remedy fundamental differences existing 
between the member states. Thanks partly to this, the ECB's program, 
implemented since 2015, has had limited success in rendering monetary 
transmission to one direction in the euro area. 
Furthermore, the progress of the Fed's normalization program has led to 
new circumstances. It is unavoidable to examine what was the cause of 
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the increase in European yields in 2017 and whether a revision of ECB's 
policy is needed due to this. If results are lagging despite the program 
continuing and negative side-effects are deepening, criticisms may mount 
against ECB policy. The disturbance in member state unity supporting the 
ECB would cause a weakening of the credibility of the common monetary 
policy and of the ECB. This itself jeopardizes the effectiveness of 
monetary policy, and can easily lead to divergent processes in the euro 
area, a deterioration of financial stability and, in a serious case, a euro 
crisis. This is why it is important to monitor the effectiveness and risks of 
the program in the euro area and pursue research on this issue. 
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5. New and novel scientific results 
 
1. During the financial crisis of 2007-2008, and after the normalization of 
markets, now for about a decade, the practice of monetary policy is 
dominated by non-conventional instruments instead of the conventional 
ones. Their use is attributed in the literature primarily to the zero lower 
bound, and second, to the restoration of monetary transmission and to the 
elimination of the financial crisis. The dissertation made a detailed 
analysis of the instruments used by the central banks in its "lender of last 
resort" role, and the instruments applied following the crisis. On the basis 
of this, it gave a definition for non-conventional instruments in novel 
approach: not in the usual form by type or by enumerating tem, but 
in the way as they differ from the conventional practice and in the 
character of their non-conventional nature. To sum up, central bank 
measures that do not fit into the conventional practice is broadly referred 
to as non-conventional. Included here cases, when the central bank: 
 implements radical changes in its conventional instruments and/or 
uses them to an extraordinary extent; 
 applies non-operative instruments in an operative manner; 
 extends its operations beyond traditional market agents and markets;   
 applies innovative instruments with an effect that departs from 
conventional logic; 
 defines unconventional operating or intermediate objectives; 
 substantially alters its communication. 
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2. The impact of non-conventional instruments on monetary policy cannot 
be regarded as temporary. The dissertation collected the changes that can 
be assumed remain determinative in monetary policy for a longer period. 
On the basis of an analysis of crisis management experience and its 
consequences on monetary policy, as a new result, it identified two 
lasting effects. On the one hand, due to the interconnection of markets 
and the mutual interdependence of financial intermediaries, the central 
bank's "lender of last resort" role cannot be strictly limited to only 
the banking system. This entails the expansion of the group of central 
bank's eligible counterparties, resulting in a wide range of central bank 
instruments becoming accessible for many financial actors outside the 
banks too. On the other hand, instead of the traditional short-term central 
bank liquidity facilities, the weight has shifted to longer term funding. 
Because this is important in avoiding and managing crisis situations, 
longer-term liquidity providing instruments can lastingly be part of 
the toolset in the future. 
3. Concerning quantitative easing instruments used in the zero 
interest rate environment, as a new finding, the dissertation concludes 
that these instruments are expected to continue to be involved in the 
central bank practice in the future. These instruments have changed 
central bank balance sheets for the long term and downsizing them is not 
possible in the short term. However, their presence in the balance sheet 
does not rule out the use of the conventional interest rate policy. 
Furthermore, most probably, the low-interest rate environment will 
persist. Therefore, in normal times, the slow decline of the central 
bank balance sheet and the use of the traditional interest rate policy 
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are likely to prevail, while during periods requiring monetary easing, 
the instruments recently used will be applied again. 
4. The dissertation evaluated the proposals for changing monetary policy 
objectives. Based on the analysis of their benefits and disadvantages, it 
came to new conclusions. No change expected in the objectives; on the 
contrary, the flexible inflation targeting regime has been reinforced. 
In terms of the quantified inflation target, although strong arguments 
support an upward movement from the current 2 percent value, rather it 
is likely, that debate calms down, and the initiative will be given up 
because of the risks of its impact on inflation expectations, and of the 
international implications of the modification. A change in this issue can 
be expected only if, as a result of a debate on a sustained slowdown in 
growth, a change of the quantified target value, as a possible response 
of monetary policy, would be reassessed.  
5. An important consequence of the crisis was the appreciation of 
financial stability issues, that led to a comprehensive reform of the 
financial sector’s regulation and, in general, of the institutional system of 
supervision. The dissertation did deal with the question of how financial 
stability objectives can be implemented in monetary policy. It was 
discussed, why the previous consensus was modified, instead of the 
adoption of the opposing "leaning against the wind" policy, leaving the 
mandate of monetary policy unchanged while financial stability 
strengthened and, based on the reform, the management of systemic risk 
was given to a separate macroprudential authority. The dissertation 
concluded newly that, despite this, there are several factors - the 
question of the coordination of macroprudential and monetary policy 
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objectives, the effectiveness of macroprudential policy and 
instruments and the theoretical development of "leaning against the 
wind" policy - whose future development may influence the 
relationship between financial stability and monetary policy. 
6. The dissertation discusses in detail the ECB's practice in recent years. 
Numerous opinions and criticisms have emerged about the ECB's 
program. In addition to evaluating these thoroughly, the dissertation, in its 
novel approach, seeks to find out the effects of the European delay. It 
analyzes why the ECB started its QE program years later than the other 
leading central banks. Besides discovering the reasons for this, the main 
focus was to reveal the consequences of the delay. Accepting the 
consensus that the program has been successful so far, it has also 
examined the criticisms and their merits. On the one hand, it was 
concluded that - due to the delay – the ECB had to compile and 
quantify its program in such a manner that it be sufficiently effective 
despite the delays, but this increased the risk due to the undesirable 
side effects. However, success is hampered by a number of factors, the 
impact have also diminished recently. On the other hand, analyzing the 
risks, the dissertation argues that the fragmentation of the Eurozone 
market in several respects has not improved, the possibilities of the 
program are limited in this area. The inadequacy of results can easily 
lead to the deterioration of the unity behind the common monetary 
policy, which is a major threat. 
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